Bleeding Bases, Broken Intel: The Unfolding Crisis in Borno’s Military Operations

By Oladapo Ojo

The alarming rate of attacks on military bases across Borno State is a pressing concern, with scores of military personnel losing their lives in preventable incidents. The latest attack on the Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Marte, where scores of soldiers were killed and abducted, is a stark reminder of the need for improved security measures. It’s not farfetched that the army is now begging people to apply to join their intake, why won’t such be the case?

Despite billions of dollars spent on arms and ammunition, the attacks continue to escalate. According to a publication from This Day newspaper, a total of 8.3 trillion was earmarked for Defence between 2021-2025 budgets.

The Nigerian Air Force’s role in coordination with the army is crucial, yet there are concerns over the limited use of certain aircraft, such as the Tucano jets, due to manufacturer agreements. For instance, a senator recently claimed that the air force chief mentioned limitations in using these jets due to agreements with the manufacturer. This raises questions about the procurement process and whether these assets are being utilized effectively.

On the 19th of March, a captain used his tank to block terrorist vehicle that was laden with IED, the vehicle was headed for the office of the brigade commander, he stopped it but paid the supreme price. Exactly, two weeks after, the Boko Haram Terrorists (BHT) in their large number overran same FOB, something that could have been prevented, if the army and air force were in synergy and had done surveillance of the area after the first attack, then take offensive measures, instead of doing more defensive. They only started pocket bombing 2 weeks after the FOB Wajiroko, was ransacked.

Intelligence agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA), and the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) ARMY, must improve their coordination and sharing of intelligence to prevent these attacks. The current state of intelligence gathering and sharing is inadequate, and it’s imperative that these agencies work together seamlessly to provide timely and accurate information to support military operations.

The involvement of political office holders in military operations can compromise their effectiveness. Local government chairmen, special advisers, and other political office holders should not have access to operation rooms of military commands, as this can lead to the infiltration of military coordination and compromise operational security. Military officers should uphold honour, prioritizing their duty to protect the nation over personal interests and not genuflect to civilians in authority for the sake of welfare (monetary gifts).

The military must also leverage innovative technologies, such as drones and aerial assets, to enhance their capabilities and prevent attacks. The times have changed from who has more battle tanks to who has aerial superiority in the form of drones and other air assets. Furthermore, the ideology of reforming repentant terrorists must be reevaluated, as it may not be effective in preventing further attacks. Many supposed repentant BHT repent to spy and return back to use the information to attack. There have been rumours of such return to terrorism.

Military operations must prioritize success over media validation. Commanding officers should focus on what will keep their men alive rather than seeking good profiles on social media and journalists. If a soldier must die, he should die gallantly because all was done but it was inevitable, not something that could be prevented due to lack of preparedness or intelligence. The Nigerian military must address these challenges and improve their intelligence gathering, coordination, and use of technology to prevent further attacks and protect their personnel.